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# Emergency Preparedness: Issues for the Year 2000 and Beyond

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### Abstract

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A historical perspective of civil preparedness is provided. Geopolitical events that contributed to the program's development and evolution are reviewed. Within this historical context, public and legislative attitudes are reviewed and their relevance to today's program is established. The paper outlines other current attitudes and trends that must be addressed and managed if the program is to survive and be a credible component in our national security strategy. Specific issues and trends that are analyzed include: geo-political changes, resource considerations, and workforce trends.

Finally, the paper provides short and long term recommendations that should be considered in managing these trends and re-shaping opinions and attitudes within both the legislative and executive branches of government. These recommendations include: establishing strategic planning systems, training and continuing the education of the workforce, and changing the culture within our emergency preparedness organizations by establishing new flexible employee relationships in conjunction with innovative organizational structures. It is argued that such changes will result in a new breed of worker: free thinking, innovative and more capable of dealing with the challenges that lie ahead.

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**Gil H. Jamieson**  
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# Emergency Preparedness: Issues for the Year 2000 and Beyond

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### Abstract

This paper examines issues that will influence and direct the future course of emergency preparedness programs. Although the issues reviewed here will affect all preparedness programs, this paper specifically focuses on civil preparedness.

A historical perspective of civil preparedness is provided. Geo-political events that contributed to the program's development and evolution are reviewed. Within this historical context, public and legislative attitudes are reviewed and their relevance to today's program is established. The paper outlines other current attitudes and trends that must be addressed and managed if the program is to survive and be a credible component in our national security strategy. Specific issues and trends that are analyzed include: geo-political changes, resource considerations, and workforce trends.

Finally, the paper provides short and long term recommendations that should be considered in managing these trends and re-shaping opinions and attitudes within both the legislative and executive branches of government. These recommendations include: establishing strategic planning systems, training and continuing the education of the workforce, and changing the culture within our emergency preparedness organizations by establishing new flexible employee relationships in conjunction with innovative organizational structures. It is argued that such changes will result in a new breed of worker: free thinking, innovative and more capable of dealing with the challenges that lie ahead.



## Emergency Preparedness: Issues for the Year 2000 and Beyond

### Introduction:

More and more reports are beginning to emerge on issues that will confront our leaders in the Year 2000 and beyond. This study continues that trend but specifically focuses on the large external forces that will influence the direction, size and services of emergency management programs in the years ahead. We will review domestic political trends, public attitudes, geopolitical considerations and the projected resource base, and provide recommendations on how these challenges might best be managed.

It is the central thesis of this study that continued program adjustments and reorganizations will not alone address the inevitable tide of political, social and resource considerations. Such efforts tend to camouflage the fundamental issues and are transparent efforts at bureaucratic survivalism.<sup>1</sup> I will argue that the keys to success for Emergency Management in the Year 2000 are leaders with a strategic vision, leaders capable of managing external events, and leaders capable of creating organizations which will nurture an intelligent, creative, free thinking workforce. It is this new breed of worker which will develop and influence the strategic long term solutions to the difficult emergency management issues that lie ahead.

In arguing for this long term strategy, I will endeavor to avoid a simple critical assessment of Federal, State and local efforts in emergency preparedness, however, analysis and short term alternatives will be offered. My efforts here are to persuade emergency preparedness leaders for the adoption of the initiatives I've proposed and through these arguments contribute in some small way to greater long term emergency preparedness effectiveness.

## Overview:

Emergency Preparedness is a sufficiently broad and abstract term that it requires some structure and definition. Executive Order 12656, dated November 18, 1988, defines emergency preparedness as "the capability at all levels of government to meet essential defense and civilian needs during any national security emergency." The Order also defines national security emergency as "an occurrence, including natural disaster, military attack, technological emergency, or other emergency that seriously degrades or seriously threatens the national security of the United States."<sup>2</sup>

The Executive Order identifies emergency management programs and assigns specific responsibility for these programs within the executive branch. Principal among the programs are: Continuity of Government, Civil Preparedness, and Mobilization.

Civil Preparedness will be the central focus of this study. It is defined in Executive Order 12656 as the collective Federal, State and local plans and programs to protect the population in the event of an attack on the United States. General observations and suggestions made concerning the Civil Preparedness program are also relevant to the emergency management community at large.

In spite of the recent publication of Executive Order 12656, it is important to keep in mind the legislative history and specifically the dating of the original pieces of legislation that served as the platform for this Executive Order.

Specifically, the National Defense Act of 1920, the National Security Act of 1947, the Defense Production Act of 1950, and the Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950, as amended. While few would quarrel with the "sacred" tenets of emergency preparedness and its successful tenure in achieving our past national security policy objectives, we must constructively question whether the design and structure of programs established in the late forties are still relevant and capable of supporting our national security objectives in the future.

### Emergency Preparedness: A Historical Perspective:

All of the programs that comprise the emergency preparedness community have enjoyed peaks and suffered through valleys from both a political and resource perspective. Civil Defense came to the fore as a program in 1950 with the passage of the Federal Civil Defense Act and the creation of the Federal Civil Defense Administration (FCDA). Section 2 of this Act provided broad parameters for building and managing the civil defense program and outlined rules governing the relationships of Federal, State, and local governments.

It is the policy and intent of Congress to provide a plan of civil defense for the protection of life and property in the United States from attack. It is further declared to be the policy and intent of Congress that this responsibility for civil defense shall be vested primarily in the several States and their political subdivisions. The Federal Government shall provide necessary coordination...<sup>3</sup>

For these purposes the FCDA, in its first congressional appropriation request sought \$403M for Civil Defense. Of this amount, Congress only approved \$31.75M.<sup>4</sup>

During the Eisenhower administration, a Presidential Committee was formed and requested to study alternate concepts for civil defense. The committee concluded that fallout shelters would save nearly half the estimated casualties of a nuclear attack; Eisenhower, however, preferred an evacuation program because it was cheaper. Congress, for its part, during the Eisenhower era, cut each successive civil defense budget presented.<sup>5</sup> It was

during these early years that the current political and funding debate over "protection, and at what cost" was taking shape.

Civil Defense enjoyed its high water mark in terms of funding in the early 60's but it was also during this period when the program's credibility was significantly damaged. On May 25, 1961 President Kennedy delivered a special message to Congress on

"Urgent National Needs":

This administration has been looking very hard at exactly what civil defense can and cannot do. It cannot be obtained cheaply. It cannot give an assurance of blast protection that will be proof against surprise attack or guarantee against obsolescence or destruction. And it cannot deter a nuclear attack...

But this deterrent concept assumes rational calculations by rational men. And the history of this planet is sufficient to remind us of the possibilities of an irrational attack, a miscalculation, or an accidental war which cannot be either foreseen or deterred. The nature of modern warfare heightens these possibilities. It is on this basis that civil defense can be readily justified--as insurance for the civilian population in the event of such a miscalculation. It is insurance we trust will never be needed--but insurance which we could never forgive ourselves for foregoing in the event of catastrophe.<sup>6</sup>

This speech's forcefully directed the nation's attention to civil defense and contributed to a public reaction with which the program still must contend. Following this speech, Time reported on a profiteer who sold "lifesaving kits" containing a salve which supposedly caused radiation to ricochet harmlessly off the body. There were ads for "radiation pills", and "fallout suits", which were actually no more useful than aspirin or a raincoat in protecting against radiation. One promoter devised a "man-sized plastic bag" which he said "provided complete protection against

fallout." All the owner had to do was step inside and pull the zipper closed. Then there was the man who sold inexpensive and portable "survival shelters" which, upon receipt by mail, were found to consist of a crowbar and directions on opening manhole covers.<sup>7</sup>

During the Cuban Missile Crisis, Stuart Pittman, then Director of the Office of Civil Defense, wrote: The public exhibited a sudden concern about civil defense, widely reported by civil defense officials to take the form of one question: Where does my family go for protection if there is an attack? Millions answered the question for themselves during the crisis by leaving their homes in the cities for vacations in less target worthy localities.<sup>8</sup> In these words we see prefigured what was later to be known as crisis-relocation.

In 1978, Reorganization Plan 3 created the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) under which were consolidated all of the previously scattered responsibilities for emergency management. FEMA was "to mitigate, prepare for, respond to, and provide for the recovery from emergencies of all types--natural, technological, or attack related." In 1980, Congress amended the Federal Civil Defense Act

to emphasize crisis relocation, to enhance the survivability of both the population and the leaders of the United States, reduce U.S. vulnerability, enhance deterrence and stability, and reduce the chances of coercion by an enemy during a crisis. Attack related and disaster related resources were to be used interchangeably.<sup>9</sup>

On July 29, 1985, the House and Senate Armed Services Committees issued a Conference Report which stated: "The conferences are concerned about an apparent lack of focus and direction in the current U.S. Civil Defense Program. This situation is manifested in the funding emphasis on State and local civil disaster programs which, while meritorious, is a questionable use of national defense budget resources; and the uncertain policy implications of increased strategic defense emphasis on the civil defense program."<sup>10</sup>

The report went on to request specifically that the FEMA conduct an extensive and thorough review of national objectives, policies and programs in civil defense in order to provide a basis for decision on civil defense in the future.<sup>11</sup> In 1986, the study was completed and essentially concluded that "U.S. civil defense capabilities are low and declining."<sup>12</sup>

The FEMA Director, in a presentation to the World Future Society Conference on July 15, 1986, concluded: State and local governments, lacking the capabilities to survive, would be unable to provide citizens even the most basic life-sustaining support.<sup>13</sup>

Recently, Congressional and Executive interest in the Civil Defense program has been reactivated. Senate Report 101-128, which accompanied FEMA's 1990 Appropriation Bill, requested FEMA to -- prepare a study on the principal threats facing communities and local emergency management coordinators. Similarly, the



House Armed Services Committee in its report on FEMA's FY 1991 budget directed the Administration "to conduct a comprehensive appraisal of the civil defense policy and report back no later than March 1, 1991." Finally, the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs tasked the Policy Coordinating Committee (PCC) on Emergency Preparedness and Mobilization Planning to conduct a review of National Security Emergency Preparedness policy including Civil Defense.

How the Administration, and FEMA in particular, respond to these requests will say a lot about the future dimensions and character of emergency preparedness programs or will serve as the program's epilogue.

### Current Issues and Future Challenges:

Clearly there are some significant challenges and historical blemishes that must be overcome if civil preparedness is to be regarded as an effective and credible concept in the years ahead. With this historical perspective, it is worthwhile to examine issues that will impact the nature and direction of civil preparedness in the years ahead.

### Geo-political:

Thomas Etzold in an article entitled, "National Security and Mobilization: Emerging Issues for the 1990's", outlines some important trends that will influence how emergency management programs are shaped. He concludes:

- o Our foreign policy strategy is changing from one of containment to seeking strategic stability--from war fighting and nuclear weapons to protracted conventional conflict.
- o Our economic structure has changed and we have not assessed our present or future economic, technical, and industrial capabilities and their implication for supporting modern combat forces.
- o Traditional allies face their own sets of economic challenges. This, in conjunction with reduced threat perceptions, make it difficult to secure cooperation in security affairs.
- o Arms control efforts will ensure significant alternatives in the size, composition, disposition, doctrines, and strategies of both nuclear and non-nuclear forces.<sup>14</sup>

A recent draft policy review done at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces (ICAF) summarizes changing geo-political conditions this way:

"The changing nature of the threats facing the United States, inevitable reduction in the resources available for defense, growing problems with the U.S. industrial base, increased global interdependence, and evolutionary adjustments in the structure of the U.S. military forces will underscore and magnify current problems. Globalization, the volatility and intensified competition in the international market place and the very viability of the U.S. economy will place new stresses on the nation's mobilization potential."<sup>15</sup>

Then, somewhat fortuitously the report states: "Coalition warfare will become more important as the global scope and variety of threats exceed the capability of single states acting alone to deal with them effectively, but it will also become more difficult as more ambiguous, non-traditional threats (e.g., economic, environmental) feed disintegration tendencies among allies."<sup>16</sup>

Simon Serfaty, in his opening remarks to a 1990 Civil Defense Conference offers a new dimension to the somewhat numbing list of issues and considerations. "The impact of technological developments seems to cut in contrasting directions, making us increasingly invulnerable to certain kinds of threats while perhaps giving rise to new dangers. The Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) holds forth the promise of an era in which nuclear weapons may play only a secondary role in deterring war. But how far away is this world? What will be required to bring it about? And how can the new technology be integrated into our national security strategy?"<sup>17</sup>

### Public Attitudes:

Surveys have been conducted to gauge public attitudes about civil preparedness. Although somewhat dated, they provide useful insights into the views of the electorate.

About 50 percent of the population believes that a nuclear confrontation will occur. Only about 2-3 percent of the population believes a war would never come about. Most Americans who think a confrontation is possible believe that the conflict would be in the form of a spasm or "bolt from the blue"; 52.2 percent believe that there would be at most a day or less of warning time; 31.5 percent think 30 minutes or less.<sup>18</sup> These statistics are significant because they demonstrate the popular support, necessary for our leaders to leverage sufficient funding and support from Congress.

The surveys also indicate that Americans support measures of civil defense even if they surmise that more than one third of the nation's people might be unable to survive.<sup>19</sup> When asked about the government's main rationale for having a civil defense program, 32.2 percent cite the government's desire to save lives, 55.8 percent refer to the programs deterrent potential, only 4 percent thought that civil defense efforts could neither help save lives nor contribute to deterrence.<sup>20</sup>

There are of course countervailing attitudes. Senators Ted Kennedy and Mark Hatfield conclude: Civil defense programs are a dubious and dangerous business, which have been tried and judged

a failure many times in the past. The new proposal (crisis relocation) is the latest chapter in a long and beleaguered history of discarded programs that supposedly would save lives in a nuclear holocaust. The experience of this history reinforces the logic of common sense that any such hope is essentially illusory.<sup>21</sup> Similar views are expressed in The Final Epidemic written by the Physicians for Social Responsibility. More mainstream, Bundy, Halperin, Kaufmann, Kennan, McNamara, O'Donell, Sigal, Smith, Ullman, Warnke, express similar views in "Back from the Brink."<sup>22</sup>

#### Resource Considerations:

Robert D. Reischauer, Director of the Congressional Budget Office, provides an account of the long-term budget outlook. Mr. Reischauer acknowledges the failure of past attempts to legislate a balanced budget, i.e., Gramm-Rudman-Hollings (GRH). Instead of the -0- budget deficit planned for FY 1991, the deficit is now projected at \$360B. GRH has been replaced by a new Budget Reconciliation Bill. This approach places caps on each appropriation and requires cuts "inside" the appropriation as opposed to the disproportionate cut from defense as was the case under Gramm-Rudman-Hollings. In addition, the new bill provides for adjustment to the targets to account for the performance of the economy and waivers to the targets can be granted to allow for emergency events and conditions. Nevertheless, the cuts for both defense and non-defense programs are significant. Table A provides planned reductions by fiscal year.

TABLE A. EFFECTS OF RECENT POLICY CHANGES ON CBO  
DEFICIT PROJECTIONS (In billions of dollars)

|  | 1991      | 1992      | 1993       | 1994       | 1995       | Cumulative<br>Five-Year<br>Changes |
|--|-----------|-----------|------------|------------|------------|------------------------------------|
| Revenue Increases                                | -18       | -33       | -32        | -37        | -39        | -158                               |
| Entitlements and Other<br>Mandatory Spending     | -9        | -12       | -16        | -19        | -19        | -75                                |
| Enacted Appropriations                           |           |           |            |            |            |                                    |
| Defense  | -6        | -14       | -20        | -24        | -26        | -91                                |
| Nondefense                                       | <u>1</u>  | <u>8</u>  | <u>11</u>  | <u>12</u>  | <u>13</u>  | <u>45</u>                          |
| Subtotal   | -6        | -6        | -9         | -12        | -13        | -46                                |
| Required Reductions in<br>Discretionary Spending | n.a.      | -13       | -22        | -46        | -62        | -144                               |
| Debt Service Savings                             | <u>-1</u> | <u>-4</u> | <u>-10</u> | <u>-17</u> | <u>-27</u> | <u>-59</u>                         |
| Total  | -33       | -69       | -89        | -131       | -160       | -482                               |

SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office.

It is clear that the competition for defense related dollars will be very significant and given the political realities we must anticipate reduced levels of funding for civil preparedness programs. Under the new reconciliation bills the caps by appropriation disappear after FY 1995 and we are back to the old guns vs. butter debate once again.

Emergency preparedness program and resource managers must begin now to plan for the political resource debates and justifications that will be required to secure adequate program funding in the years ahead. The balance between resource and political issues

facing emergency preparedness managers are highlighted by Aaron Wildavsky in the following statement:

"There can be no conflict between political rationality and technical, legal, social or economic rationality because the solution of political problems makes possible an attack on any other problem, while a serious political deficiency can present or undo all other problem solving."<sup>23</sup>

#### Workforce Trends:

In the introduction to the President's FY 1991 Budget, the Office of Management and Budget Director Darman said, "Emerging demographic trends, coupled with higher job skill requirements will challenge the nation's ability to supply the highly skilled workers to sustain economic growth in the 1990's."<sup>24</sup>

These statements have been prompted in part by a series of reports outlining troubling workforce trends that will confront government and industry executives in the near future. These reports acknowledge and address the following trends:

- o The population and the workforce will grow more slowly than at any time since the 1930's.
- o The average age of the population and the workforce will rise, and the pool of young workers entering the workforce will shrink.
- o Almost two thirds of the new entrants into the workforce between now and the year 2000 will be women.
- o Minorities will be a larger share (29%) of the new entrants into the workforce between now and the year 2000.
- o Immigrants will represent the largest share of the increase in the population and the workforce since the first World War.<sup>25</sup>

Clearly, these workforce trends have broad nation implications that go well beyond the considerations for civil preparedness leaders. They do, however, cause us to ask: Where will we find qualified people to fill new emergency preparedness positions in the future? Cognizant of these trends, emergency managers should begin now to aggressively address the problem through planning and innovative recruiting measures.



### Prospects for Revitalization and Reform:

Clearly a comprehensive program of emergency preparedness cannot assimilate the vast spectrum of opinions and attitudes on this controversial subject. So, "are we destined to drift with the tide of events? Or can we begin to reconcile the desirable with the possible?"<sup>26</sup> In my view some short term actions can be taken to gain support and credibility within both the executive and legislative branches of government. These actions can be taken with a 1 to 3 year period and are low cost.

As mentioned in the historical overview, two external requests are forcing an articulation of civil preparedness programs in the Year 2000. The House Committee on Armed Services specifically directed the Administration to conduct a comprehensive appraisal of the Civil Defense policy and specifically address: (1) the pertinence of current statutory authorities and associated executive orders and national security decision memoranda, (2) an assessment of how well the civil defense program has been implemented at the State and local levels, (3) an analysis of the effect of recent events on the program, (4) an assessment of whether funding for a revised civil defense program should come out of the defense budget, and (5) a recommendation to the Congress of any legislation changes that may be required.<sup>27</sup>

Similarly, an Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs requested that the Administration review current civil defense policies and authorities, evaluate them in light of

current and projected trends and events and assess the need for recommended changes in civil defense law and policy.<sup>28</sup>

The report to the House was due March 1, 1991, however, it was unavailable for consideration in the study. The draft report on Civil Defense from the NSC was available and probably foreshadows what will eventually be passed on to Congress in response to their request. This report concludes that:

- o The Administration should seek no change to the Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950, as amended.
- o The Civil Defense program should remain in the defense authorization.
- o That new studies be authorized to articulate capability requirements.
- o In addition, policy changes be made that will:
  - make civil defense a focal point within Federal, State and local governments for integrated multi-hazard catastrophic emergency response planning and operations;
  - continue policy of dual defense resource use (i.e., attack and other emergencies);
  - focus on the development of the required capabilities common to all catastrophic emergencies and those unique to attack emergencies.<sup>29</sup>

In the minds of civil preparedness planners, the changes advocated in this report more than likely reflect a dramatic philosophical shift. But members of Congress, and the National Security Council, may well be asking what significant changes have occurred and whether the changes respond to recent international and domestic political trends?

This impression is further supported when one reviews Target 2000: Civil Defense Strategic Goals and Objectives, a draft of a working document provided by FEMA. This document begins with the phrase, "Every President since Truman, and every Congress, has affirmed that Civil Defense is a part of our Nation's strategic defense." Although true, it seems questionable to begin a forward looking document with this "stay the course" theme. This aside, there are more serious objections.

The Department of Defense may refuse, for the first time, to include in its budget hearing testimony that civil defense contributes to the nation's nuclear deterrence strategy.

Further, DOD has non-concurred on the referenced version of the PCC report. The non-concurrence was based on DOD's desire to leave open the questions of changes to the Civil Defense Act and removal of civil defense from the defense appropriation. They are also not convinced that the communication of planning for all hazards, i.e., attack and all other is appropriate. Given the long standing traditional objections to civil defense by some in Congress and now reservation from within the national security community, it appears questionable to proceed with the strategy proposed in the PCC report.

The key issue for the "new" civil defense strategy seems to center around making the connection between the common areas of planning for natural and technological hazards response and recovery and nuclear attack. The strategy suggests there is a

void in the disaster response legislation and that civil defense can/should fill this void and take the planning lead. The most recent amendments to the Disaster Relief Act (Stafford Act) provide sufficient authority for the Federal Government to assume any role in disaster operations (response/recovery, etc.) if such action is in concert with a State Governor's request. We should not carve out a "new" role for civil defense based solely on an ambiguous interpretation of current program guidance.

#### Short Term Alternatives for Revitalization:

With fading support from Congress, the NSC and the Department of Defense, it seems questionable to proceed with the "new" strategy outlined by FEMA in the draft PCC report. It would be more appropriate to establish a strategy in conjunction with traditional allies, not apart from them. A short term strategy to accomplish this and break the stagnation of the existing program follows:

1. Initiate communication with minority leadership and members of the House Committee on Armed Services and their staff. Acknowledge differences on the future direction of civil defense from within the Administration and Congress. Indicate a willingness to reopen the question of new civil defense legislation. Request joint Administration and Congressional consideration of this issue. The process of debate is healthy, will encourage and ensure Congressional commitment to the outcome, and will not preclude the

administration from calling forth the same points in the NSC report should they find it prudent to do so.

2. Change the current manner of doing business with the States -- use grants instead of the existing cooperative agreement. Maintain the current program requirements for now -- but begin the process of close evaluation of existing requirements and set the stage for new, streamlined relations with States.

These two actions will begin the process of program revitalization by initiating changes to the way the program is perceived and delivered. They will cause the people assigned to these programs at both the Federal and State level to think differently about what they do and how they do it. These actions will also demonstrate leadership and initiative to Congress and begin the process of building new alliances by inviting them into the rebuilding process. This proactive approach is sure to result in a new program structure and lower funding levels. Clearly, these consequences are painful, but necessary to ensure a revitalized program, better positioned and supported to deal with the challenges that lie ahead.

#### Long Term Alternatives for Revitalization:

A central tenet of this paper is that fundamental changes must occur in the way people think about civil preparedness issues. Further, these changes will only occur if our leaders change our current planning assumptions and processes, change traditional

employee relationships and change the dynamics within our current organization structures. The following section attempts to focus on those initiatives which may produce these fundamental changes over time.

1. Strategic Planning:

The current trends outlined herein cannot be addressed or reversed easily. Some form of strategic planning system is essential for leaders to create the vision necessary to articulate an organization's future position and subsequently drive out a series of principals and objectives needed to achieve this position. The system must enjoy the commitment of all top management since the results are likely to bring friction and produce resistance from entrenched interests. Strong leadership exercised throughout the process can counteract these attitudes, contribute to new perspectives and allow for a revitalized set of emergency management goals.<sup>30</sup> The issues and trends outlined herein are prime grist for leadership's consideration and although solutions are by no means clear, strategic planning will allow for consideration of these issues well in advance of budget cycles and the inevitable political debate.

A good example of how strategic planning can be used to address the issues and trends we've identified is offered in an industry report entitled, Outlook 2000. The report

summarizes a strategic planning process that would analyze the business environment, identify human resource implications and develop responsive strategies. The report also states that a company's labor-force supply and demand analysis must be an integral part of its corporate planning activities. Human resource involvement will be needed to assess the skills called for to meet environmental and safety requirements and to deal with the high level of competition for competent talent.<sup>31</sup> Initiatives like this one are right on target and should be replicated within the emergency management community.

There are indications that the emergency management community is beginning to focus on strategic planning as an important element in addressing the challenges ahead. The Federal Emergency Management Agency recently sponsored a conference entitled "Civil Defense in the Year 2000", and strategic planning was featured on the conference agenda.

## 2. Training and Education of the Workforce:

There will be a tendency for managers to conclude that the workforce trends discussed previously represent a failure by our educational system to adequately prepare students for productive careers. One can certainly argue this assertion, but are the arguments relevant at this point? This is not to discount the government's role in this problem, but rather to suggest that civil preparedness executives can and

should move swiftly to ensure that the human resource pipeline remains viable and thereby ensure its continued health and productivity. Civil preparedness programs are surely going to become increasingly technical and complex as they enter the next century; but so too are most programs. If we are to be successful in our revitalization efforts, we must have an educated workforce capable of solving the problems and challenges that confront them. Specific actions can be taken to provide an early advantage to the heavy recruitment pressures that can be anticipated.

Specific actions include:

- o Step up efforts to train and educate the existing workforce.
- o Eliminate barriers to recruitment and require program managers to participate in this process.
- o Provide Fellowships for young entry level workers to encourage/sponsor their continued education.
- o Provide internships and guarantee employment for post graduate students.
- o Establish Federal, State and local employee transfer programs to establish fresh perspectives. Reward these assignments through recognizing as executive development assignments.

### 3. Establish Creative Employee Relationships:

In conjunction with the education initiatives already expressed, government should move to retain and attract workers through satisfying the social requirements of its workforce. Initiatives may include:

- o Individually tailored workweeks.



- o Provision for child care.
- o Flexible organizational structures with less emphasis on traditional lines of authority and supervision.
- o Inter-governmental groups to focus on technological and research problems. The groups should be supported by management through incentives and performance recognition.

#### 4. New Management Techniques and Organizational Structures:

The computer and information technology revolution is here and it will continue to affect the way we work, solve problems, and organize ourselves to accomplish these tasks. Information technology has previously been thought of as automating operations, i.e., replace the human body with a technology that enables the same processes to be performed with more continuity and control. Now, however, we must recognize that this same technology generates information about the underlying production and administrative processes through which an organization accomplishes its work. This new "transparency" enables new innovative thinking toward problems previously viewed in inner logical constructs. Activities, events, and objects are translated into "informants" as well as automates.<sup>32</sup> The informing power of computer technology will provide for a more comprehensive understanding of ones own work and introduces the possibility of question, choice, and innovation. Organizations, on the other hand, must provide performance opportunities; that is, conditions must exist that require, invite, and nurture these new skills. Such conditions are

likely to involve relationships of collaboration and mutuality, where the emphasis is on achieving the best interpretation of shared information rather than on gaining personal advantage on the basis of private knowledge.<sup>33</sup>

A vision of how the new organization might look is provided as Table B. Key features of this organization are: (1) shared and universal access to information and (2) the absence of transition "vertical lines of authority." The evolution to the new organization may be described this way:

"The shifting grounds of knowledge invite managers to recognize the emergent demands for intellectual skills and develop a learning environment in which skills can develop. That very recognition contains a threat to managerial authority, which depends in part upon control over the organization's knowledge base. Managers who must prove and defend their own legitimacy do not easily share knowledge or engage in inquiry. Workers who feel the requirements of subordination are not enthusiastic learners. New roles cannot emerge without the structure to support them."<sup>34</sup>


If managers are to alter their behavior, then methods of evolution and reward that encourage them to do so must be in place. The interdependence among these dilemmas means that technology alone no matter how well designed or implemented, cannot be relied upon to carry the full weight of an information strategy. Managers must have an awareness of the choices to face a desire to exploit the informing capacity of the new technology, and a commitment to fundamental change in the landscape of authority if a comprehensive informing strategy is to succeed. Without this strategic commitment, the hierarchy

will use technology to reproduce itself. Technology development in the absence of organizational innovations will be assimilated into the status quo.<sup>35</sup>

Alvin Toffler in his recent work Powershift discusses the problem in traditional organizations this way. Traditional middle manager's main task is to collect the disputed information that the specialists have cut into fragments and synthesize it before passing it through channels to the next higher level in the power pyramid. Put differently, in every bureaucracy, knowledge is broken apart horizontally, and put back together vertically. The system worked marvelously when business moved slowly. Today, change is so accidental and the information need is so complex that the "channels are becoming clogged--because of this executives are stepping out to circumvent the system--withholding information using back channels, etc. Adding fire and confusion to the internecine wars now tearing up even the best managed bureaucracies."<sup>36</sup>

TABLE B

# Organization - 2000



"Members can be thought of as being arrayed in contention circles around a central core, that is the electronic data base." - Shoshana Zuboff

SOURCE: James Martin Associates

### Final Thoughts:

There is a tendency for Congress and political analysts to overlook or dismiss the complexity and magnitude of the problems and issues that our emergency preparedness programs address. I would submit that these problems are among the toughest and most complex challenges that confront this nation and its leaders. However, in spite of their disjointed history, emergency management programs have been designed and managed by top notch public administrators dedicated and committed to public service. It is unreasonable and short sighted to assume that the new trends and challenges that confront us today can be addressed through periodic "retreats and reorganizational shuffles." In fact, the mere suggestion of this ad hoc approach contributes more to the problem than it does to solve it.

Nevertheless, the political challenges from within the Administration and from Congress are serious and immediate. We must embark now on new, creative, long term strategies that can produce dividends in the years ahead. The strategies must be based on strategic vision that factors in geo-political trends, new management and organizational approaches and a renewed commitment to our workers. At the same time we must construct short term strategies that address social and political concerns head on. We can not sustain a civil preparedness program which stubbornly holds to the same basic legislation, program structure and preparedness requirements.

### End Notes

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